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One might reasonably wonder why a chapter on false advertising law 
appears in a volume on private law theory. In the United States false advertising 
law lives in statutes and regulations; it is enforced by federal agencies and state 
attorneys general; and its rules can seem designed more to promote consumer 
welfare and market efficiency than to enforce interpersonal obligations or 
compensate for wrongful losses. If one views the divide between public and 
private law as a fixed border between independent regions, false advertising 
law appears to fall in the domain of public law. 
This chapter’s working hypothesis is that that picture is a false one. 
Although it can be helpful to distinguish private from public law, the line 
between them is not so sharp. Laws that fall on the private side of the divide 
can be designed in light of purposes and principles commonly associated with 
public law, and vice versa. U.S. false advertising law provides an example. 
Despite the fact that it is commonly classified as public law, one can find in it 
structures, functions, and values commonly associated with private law. The 
structural features include horizontal duties, transfer remedies, private 
enforcement, and judge-made rules. These features are partly remnants of 
earlier private law causes of action. But as legislators and courts adapted those 
old actions to the new phenomenon of mass consumer marketing, they 
imposed on advertisers new types of obligations. Those obligations suggest, to 
use Henry Smith’s term, an emergent ethics of false advertising.2 Although it 
differs from its common law ancestors, false advertising law can be understood 
within the private law framework.3 
False advertising law is unusual in that it imposes on advertisers one 
duty owed to two distinct categories of persons.4 The duty not to engage in 
deceptive advertising is owed both to consumers, who might be deceived by an 
 
1 Agnes N. Williams Research Professor & Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
2 Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent Private Law, in Oxford Handbook of 
New Private Law ___ (A. Gold et al. eds., 2020). 
3 For comparable analysis of a neighboring field, see Mark P. McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839 (2007).  
4 Or depending on how one individuates duties, two duties with the same 
content owed to different persons. 
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advertisement, and to honest competitors, who might lose sales as a result of 
consumer deception. 
The content of the duty differs from false advertising law’s common law 
ancestors. With respect to consumers, common law duties not to lie or 
negligently make false statements are replaced by the responsibility not to 
cause consumers to hold false beliefs. Inquiries into meaning and truth thus give 
way to questions about cause and effect. With respect to competitors, common 
law duties not to defame are replaced by a duty to adhere to commonly 
recognized rules of the marketplace. The wrong of calumny is supplanted by the 
wrong of cheating. Like other areas of private law, there are ethical aspects to 
these legal obligations. But they differ from those of false advertising law’s 
common law ancestors. 
This chapter argues also that although an advertiser’s duties can be 
understood in private law terms, advertising’s one-to-many structure poses 
practical challenges to traditional private law mechanisms and the values 
sometimes associated with them. Despite the fact that U.S. false advertising law 
includes backward-looking consumer remedies, the small sums at stake, the 
difficulty of proving causation and individual loss, and the costs of distributing 
awards make it difficult to fully compensate consumer victims. For some of the 
same reasons, consumers often do not exercise their power to sue false 
advertisers. Finally, although the relevant statutes are drafted to invite judges to 
develop something like a common law of false advertising, courts of general 
jurisdiction are ill-equipped to make many of the factual determinations false 
advertising law requires. 
Part One provides a brief introduction to U.S. false advertising law and 
identifies several structural features associated with the private law. Part Two 
analyzes false advertising law’s consumer-oriented duties. Part Three discusses 
an advertiser’s duties to its competitors. Part Four examines practical 
impediments to consumer lawsuits, consumer oriented remedies, and 
adjudicative resolution of false advertising claims. These impediments suggest 
often unnoticed factual predicates of the traditional private law framework. 
1 Background 
1.1 False Advertising Law in the United States 
False advertising law in the United States is an assemblage. Its primary 
components are section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, and state consumer protection and false advertising statutes. 
This section provides an overview of each. 
When enacted in 1914, section 5 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Act focused not on consumer protection but on “unfair methods of competition 
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in commerce.”5 Early judicial decisions on the scope of section 5 were mixed. 
Some courts read it as limited to already recognized forms of unfair 
competition, or to require evidence of harm to competitors.6 Others suggested 
that practices that were deceptive or unfair to consumers fell within section 5’s 
ambit because they could be assumed to harm honest and upstanding 
competitors.7 In 1938, Congress codified and extended the broader readings by 
amending section 5 to additionally prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”8 The House Report explained that the purpose of the new language 
was to “prevent such acts or practices which injuriously affect the general public 
as well as those which are unfair to competitors.”9 The 1938 amendment also 
added a new section 12 expressly providing that false advertising qualifies as an 
unfair and deceptive practice.10 
The FTC Act does not create a private right of action but vests sole 
enforcement authority in the Federal Trade Commission. In its present form, the 
Act provides a variety of remedies. The FTC can issue cease-and-desist orders, 
seek injunctive relief via the courts, and ask for civil penalties.11 The Act also 
provides for “such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to 
consumers or other persons . . . resulting from [a] rule violation.”12 That relief 
can include “rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or 
return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification respecting 
the rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice.”13 
The other major federal false advertising statute is the Lanham Act, first 
enacted in 1946. The Lanham Act is primarily a federal trademark law, 
protecting both registered and unregistered marks. Like the FTC Act, the 
Lanham Act originally focused on unfair competition, not consumer protection. 
As enacted, however, section 43(a) prohibited the use of any “false designation 
 
5 Act to Create the Federal Trade Commission, Pub. L. No. 203, ch. 311, § 5, 38 
Stat. 717, 719 (1914). 
6 See, e.g., FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427-29 (1920), overruled by FTC v. Brown 
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 651 (1931). 
7 See, e.g., FTC v. Winsted Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & 
Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1934). 
8 Act to Amend the Act Creating the Federal Trade Commission, Pub. L. No. 75-
447, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45). 
9 H.R. Rep. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937); see also FTC v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (discussing legislative history of the 
FTC Act). 
10 Supra note 8, at § 4, 52 Stat. at 114-15 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
52). 
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 45(m)(1)(A), 54(a). 
12 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). 
13 Id. 
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of origin, or any false description or representation” of goods or services.14 As 
with section 5 of the original FTC Act, courts disagreed on the scope of section 
43(a). Some circuits adopted narrow readings, emphasizing the connection to 
the common law tort of passing off one’s own products as those of another.15 
Others read “any false description or representation” in section 43(a) to capture 
other forms of false advertising.16 In 1988 Congress amended the Lanham Act to 
conform to the broader readings by adding section 43(a)(1)(B), which prohibits 
 
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, 
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, 
or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in commercial 
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, 
services, or commercial activities.17 
 
Courts have uniformly read this language to prohibit any advertising that 
actually deceives or has the tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the 
audience as to a material fact.18 
Keeping with its origins in unfair competition law, courts have continued 
to hold that the Lanham Act grants standing only to competitors.19 Consumers 
do not have a federal right of action against false advertisers. The Lanham Act 
offers competitor-plaintiffs a range of remedies, including damages in the 
amount of lost sales or the defendant’s profits, negative injunctions against the 
deceptive behavior, and occasionally an order that the defendant engage in 
corrective advertising.20 
If consumers wish to sue a false advertiser, they must turn to state 
consumer protection laws. Many of these laws were enacted in the late 1960s 
and early ‘70s, and all were designed to protect consumers. Because the 
 
14 Act of July 5, 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. 79-489, ch. 540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 
441 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127). 
15 E.g., Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 491 (1st Cir. 
1988); Fur Info. & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, Inc., 501 F.2d 1048, 
1051 (2d Cir. 1974). 
16 E.g., U–Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (9th 
Cir. 1982); L’Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954). 
17 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 
3946 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)). 
18 See, e.g., Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(citing cases). 
19 See, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 
U.S. 118, 129 (2014). This despite the fact that the Lanham Act grants standing 
to “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such 
act.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a), 1117(a).  
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statutes commonly adopt the “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” 
language of the FTC Act, they are often referred to as “UDAP” statutes. In 
addition to UDAP statutes, some states also have laws that specifically address 
false advertising.21 State statutes commonly provide for enforcement both by 
state attorneys general and consumer lawsuits.22 Remedies to consumers 
generally include compensatory damages, rescission, and restitution. Many 
statutes also provide for minimum per-violation awards, damage multipliers, 
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.23 
1.2 Private Law Elements in False Advertising Law 
With this basic description of U.S. false advertising law, I now turn to its 
private-law aspects. The best definition of “private law” depends on a theorist’s 
interests. Like Thomas Merrill, I employ a catholic, multi-factor conception.24 
Laws traditionally understood as belonging to private law are characterized by 
four structural features: horizontal duties, private transfer remedies, private 
enforcement, and common law origins. Each appears in U.S. false advertising 
law. That fact does not in itself entail that false advertising law should be 
classified as part of the private law in any theoretically interesting sense—that it 
serves functions or embodies values characteristic of private law. But compiling 
the relevant structural features is a start. 
Laws categorized as private law establish horizontal duties: obligations 
owed to other persons.25 A duty is horizontal if its violation wrongs someone—a 
person to whom the duty was owed.26 The private law does not include duties 
 
21 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 (2019); N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 350-a 
(2019). 
22 See Dee Pridgen & Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Protection and the Law §§ 
6.2 & 7.1 (West 2018). 
23 Id. at § 6.1. 
24 Thomas W. Merrill, Private and Public Law, in Oxford Handbook of New 
Private Law ___ (A. Gold et al. eds., 2020). 
25 Private laws establish jural relations other than duties—powers, privileges, 
immunities, etc. When thinking about false advertising law, it is simpler to focus 
on duties. 
26 Or more precisely, the violation of a horizontal duty “involves an interference 
with one of a set of individual interests that are significant enough aspects of a 
person’s well-being to warrant the imposition of a duty on others not to 
interfere with the interest in certain ways, notwithstanding the liberty 
restriction inherent in such a duty imposition.” John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917, 937 (2010). This fairly 
minimalist definition skips over several interesting nuances, such as whether a 
wrong should always be conceived as the violation of a right. 
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owed to the state,27 such as the duty to pay taxes, or to no one, such as 
victimless crimes. Under U.S. false advertising law, the legal duty not to engage 
in deceptive advertising appears to be owed to two categories of persons: 
consumers and competitors. 
A second characteristic of private law is that the legal response to a 
violation includes a transfer from the wrongdoer to the victim. That transfer 
might take the form of the payment of money, an injunction enforceable by the 
victim, or the transfer of a legal entitlement. U.S. false advertising law includes 
transfer remedies of these types. The Lanham Act provides competitors both 
injunctive and monetary relief. And the remedial measures found in the FTC Act 
and state UDAP statutes include transfers to consumer victims, often in the 
form of money damages. Both the FTC Act and UDAP statutes, however, include 
remedies not traditionally associated with the private law, such as fines, 
administrative orders, and injunctions granted state enforcement bodies. 
The third design element is perhaps most familiar: private law puts the 
victim in charge of pursuing the remedy. The private law is a sphere of private 
enforcement. Here too U.S. false advertising law is partly private and partly 
public in structure. Both the Lanham Act and state UDAP statutes empower 
putative victims of false advertising—competitors and consumers respectively—
to sue. The FTC Act and state UDAP statutes, however, also provide for public 
enforcement. 
Finally, private law is often viewed as belonging to the common law. 
Legislation at most makes changes around the edges, or codifies judge-made 
rules. Here false advertising law might appear to differ, as it is a creature of 
statutes and, to some extent, regulations issued by the FTC or state attorneys 
general. That said, like many other laws that address fraud and deception,28 
those statutes draw on common law concepts and are worded in ways that 
invite courts to fill in the details. This is especially true of the Lanham Act, which 
is enforced solely through private suits. Courts play an essential role in the 
elaboration of false advertising law. 
The fact that U.S. false advertising law exhibits these structural features 
does not entail that false advertising law qualifies as private law in anything but 
the thinnest sense. If private law is an interesting theoretical category, it is 
because its structural features reflect distinctive functions or social values. To 
say that false advertising law displays features of the private law in a more 
interesting sense requires a theory of private law that ascribes to it distinctive 
purposes or principles. 
That is not the project of this chapter. Instead, I approach the question 
from below. Parts Two and Three compare advertisers’ horizontal duties to 
analogous or ancestral common law torts. Despite differences, the duties false 
 
27 Except insofar as the state acts in a private capacity, as when it enters into a 
contract. 
28 For example, the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, which prohibit “any 
scheme or artifice to defraud.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2019). 
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advertising law imposes can be understood in ethical, nonconsequentialist 
terms familiar to the private law. Part Four then discusses challenges mass 
consumer advertising poses to the realization of values associated with transfer 
remedies, private enforcement, and the role of courts. 
2 An Advertiser’s Duties to Consumers 
False advertising law imposes a duty on advertisers not to deceive 
consumers.29 Insofar as the duty is owed consumers, the most similar torts are 
deceit and negligent misrepresentation, which also address harms deception 
causes the deceived—as distinguished, say, from defamation, which addresses 
harms to persons about whom false statements are made. The duty that false 
advertising law imposes on advertisers, however, is very different from those 
torts. This Part advances two claims: that the differences are partly explained by 
the fact that our everyday interpretive practices and moral intuitions are not 
well-suited to the communications one finds in mass advertising; and that the 
duty false advertising law imposes on advertisers can nonetheless be 
understood as an ethical obligation. 
There are three salient differences between an advertiser’s legal duties 
and the duties imposed on a speaker by the torts of deceit and negligent 
misrepresentation. First, whereas the common law torts require proof that the 
defendant made a false statement of fact on which the plaintiff relied, false 
advertising law asks whether the advertisement caused in consumers a false 
belief. The first element of both deceit and negligent misrepresentation is that 
the defendant made a false statement of fact.30 The falsehood might be 
express—a literal falsehood—or implied—as in the familiar doctrine of half-
truths. In either case, truth is a defense to the tort. Truth is not always a defense 
in false advertising actions. Both the FTC Act and most state UDAP statutes 
prohibit not false statements, but “deceptive acts and practices.” And most 
courts have read the Lanham Act to sometimes impose liability when consumers 
draw false inferences from an advertiser’s true statements.31 The ultimate 
 
29 There are shades of difference here between the FTC Act, the Lanham Act, 
and relevant state laws. But all are similar enough in general approach to be 
treated together. 
30 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 525, 552 (1977). 
31 See, e.g., Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the packaging words “Fruit Juice” juxtaposed alongside images of 
fruits like oranges, peaches, strawberries, and cherries could potentially suggest 
that those fruits or their juices are contained in the product, in violation of 
California’s UDAP statute prohibiting “not just advertisement that is false, but 
also advertisement which, although true … has a capacity … to deceive or 
confuse the public.”); Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 
568, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the literally true statement “hospitals 
recommend acetaminophen, the aspirin-free pain reliever in Anacin-3, more 
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question in most false advertising cases is not whether the advertisement was 
true or false, but whether it deceived or was likely to deceive consumers.32 
Second, whereas the torts of deceit or negligent misrepresentation 
require a showing that the plaintiff’s reliance was justifiable or reasonable,33 
most false advertising laws have no justified-reliance requirement.34 All that is 
required is that the advertisement deceived or had a tendency to deceive a 
substantial portion of the audience. Third, whereas the torts require a showing 
of fault, liability for false advertising is generally strict. Actual or probable 
deceptive effect is enough, whether or not the advertiser was or should have 
been aware of that effect. Taking the second and third points together, we 
might say that false advertising law expects less of consumers and more of 
advertisers than do the correlate torts. 
What explains these differences?35 The torts of deceit and negligent 
misrepresentation deploy our everyday interpretive abilities and moral 
sensibilities to draw a clear, if not always crisp, line between the permissible 
and the impermissible. A person commits one or the other tort when she 
intentionally, recklessly, or negligently says something false with the intent to 
cause a hearer to rely, the hearer does reasonably rely, and the hearer suffers a 
loss as a result. Our everyday interpretive abilities and moral sensibilities are 
less well-suited to the interpretation and evaluation of advertisements.36 
 
than any other pain reliever” violated the Lanham Act based on evidence that 
consumers mistakenly inferred that most hospitals recommended Anacin-3). A 
well-known outlier is Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Mead Johnson & Co. v. 
Abbott Laboratories, 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that the literal 
meaning of “1st Choice of Doctors” insulated advertiser from liability, even if 
evidence suggested that most consumers took away the message that the 
product was the choice of most doctors). 
32 The above oversimplifies a bit. Courts have held that a literally false statement 
might violate false advertising laws without separate evidence of consumer 
deception, on the theory that a literal falsehood can be presumed deceptive. 
33 For more on how this element of the torts has shifted over time, see Mark P. 
Gergen, A Wrong Turn in the Law of Deceit, 106 Geo. L. J. 555 (2018). 
34 Some courts have read false advertising statutes to prohibit only 
advertisements likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. The requirement is 
not, however, uniform, and judicial understandings of reasonableness are often 
highly forgiving. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Deceptive Advertising and Taking 
Responsibility for Others, in The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics 470, 476-79 
(Anne Barnhill et al. eds., 2018). 
35 I discuss the themes in this paragraph and the next in greater detail in Gregory 
Klass, Meaning, Purpose and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 Geo. L.J. 449 
(2012). See also Shiffrin, supra note 34, at 474 n.12. 
36 Rebecca Tushnet has pushed back against such claims and argued that courts 
and juries are more capable of recognizing implicit and deceptive messages than 
current Lanham Act jurisprudence recognizes. Rebecca Tushnet, Running the 
 
 
 
False Advertising Law 
 
 9 
Ordinary rules of linguistic interpretation presuppose conversation, shared 
context, and a degree of cooperation. Advertisements are not conversations, 
but messages broadcast to a large, heterogeneous audience; they seek not only 
to communicate, but also to influence; and they use text, sound, and images in 
ways very different from ordinary conversation.37 All this can make it difficult to 
parse what an advertisement says—which implications it is reasonable to draw 
from it. Nor is it obvious how to apply cooperative conversational ethics to 
advertisers. Because our society values economic activity, businesses are 
permitted to promote, push, and even puff their products.38 And because our 
culture places a high value on individual autonomy, state attempts to regulate 
speech based on its persuasive power are treated with suspicion.39 We presume 
individuals are competent to decide for themselves. As a result, it is not always 
obvious where to draw the line between, on the one hand, advertisers’ 
permissible attempts to affect consumers’ beliefs, preferences, and choices and, 
on the other, wrongful deception or other forms of manipulation. 
The inability of everyday conversational norms to identify what 
advertisements mean, advertisers’ obligations to consumers, and how much to 
expect of consumers themselves partly explains the law’s turn toward a more 
consequentialist and welfarist framework.40 That turn also enables false 
 
Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. Penn. 
L. Rev. 1305, 1318-27, 1337-44 (2011). 
37 For a discussion of the role of images in advertising and judicial attempts to 
take account of them, see Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images 
in Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 Hous. L. Rev. 861, 895-916 (2011). 
 Advertisements are in this respect comparable to statements by issuers 
of securities, although the communicative contents are of course very different. 
Thus Donald Langevoort has argued that ordinary rules of conversational 
implicature—such as the half-truth doctrine—should not always apply in 
securities fraud cases. Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken 
Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87 (1999). 
38 For example: “Opinions are not only the lifestyle of democracy, they are the 
brag in advertising that has made for the wide dissemination of products that 
otherwise would never have reached the households of our citizens.” Presidio 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distributing Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
39 For more on this point, see David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and 
Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 334, 353-60 (1991). 
40 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC (American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973); Howard Beales, Richard 
Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 
24 J. L. & Econ. 491 (1981); Richard Craswell, “Compared to What?” The Use of 
Control Ads in Deceptive Advertising Litigation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 757 (1997); 
Richard Craswell, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & 
 
 
 
False Advertising Law 
 
 10 
advertising law to address aspects of advertising that have no analog in the 
common law torts.41 Whereas truthfulness is a binary quality, an advertisement 
might inform one portion of the audience and deceive another, or one element 
in it might both contain useful information and mislead. A purely 
consequentialist approach can balance the welfare gains from information some 
consumers receive against the welfare losses from the false messages received 
by those or other consumers. Having replaced the inquiry into truth with one 
into deceptive effect, the law can also look beyond an advertisement’s 
communicative content to its potentially deceptive form, such as its use of 
images or placement of text. The same goes for assessing disclosures or 
disclaimers. Although disclosures and disclaimers can render an impliedly false 
advertisement truthful, they do not always prevent its deceptive effects. And 
like the advertisement itself, a disclosure or disclaimer is likely to affect different 
audience members differently and might contain multiple messages. In short, if 
it is difficult to say when an advertiser crosses the line from permissible 
persuasion to impermissible manipulation, with the right tools it is possible to 
determine when an advertisement’s deceptive effects are likely to cause a net 
reduction in consumer welfare. 
Such consequentialist and welfarist inquiries are sometimes associated 
with attempts to erase the distinction between private and public law.42 By the 
same token, false advertising law’s imposition of strict liability on advertisers 
and inattention to the reasonableness of consumer reliance might be taken to 
mean that we have left the realm of moral or ethical obligations commonly 
associated with the private law. 
But if advertisers’ legal duties to consumers differ from the common law 
obligation to tell the truth and questions of relative fault, that does not mean 
that they have no ethical content.43 Edward Balleisen describes how the 
nineteenth century emergence of new technologies of production, distribution 
and promotion generated novel ways for sellers to interact with buyers. 
 
 
Econ. 491 (1981); Richard Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 549 (1991). 
41 Richard Craswell has explored these aspects in detail. See, e.g., Richard 
Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 657 (1985); Richard 
Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in 
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 Va. L. Rev. 565 (2006); Richard Craswell, Static 
Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 
Wash. L. Rev. 333 (2013). 
42 See, for example, John Goldberg’s arguments in this volume that economic 
accounts of tort law fail to capture core aspects of it. John C.P. Goldberg, Torts, 
in Oxford Handbook of New Private Law ___ (A. Gold et al. eds., 2020). 
43 The argument in this and the next paragraph might be compared with John 
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky’s account of strict liability in The Strict Liability 
in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 743 (2016). 
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Opportunities for fraud . . . were particularly salient in the nineteenth-
century United States, where technological breakthroughs, 
transformations in finance and business organization, and the rapid 
creation of an integrated national economy sparked a series of 
economic booms, and where migration and the shifting boundaries of 
social class loosened traditional forms of communal authority. These 
conditions encouraged the flowering of a booster ethos suffused with 
thoroughgoing optimism and celebration of the rapid accumulation of 
wealth; they also fostered the emergence of pervasive information 
asymmetries. Optimism bred credulousness and willingness to take on 
risk. Profound differences in access to market intelligence limited the 
ability of investors and consumers to assess the claims of the parties 
with whom they contemplated doing business. This combination 
increased the payoffs and lowered the costs associated with fraud.44 
 
This was the milieu in which modern mass advertising was born, a form of 
communication that challenged both existing understandings of sellers’ moral 
obligations to buyers and existing private law actions. The law evolved in 
response to those challenges by assigning advertisers new types of legal 
obligations. These legal obligations, in turn, can be understood to reflect ethical 
obligations that come with these new forms of communication and persuasion. 
Seana Shiffrin has recently argued that false advertising law tracks 
moral obligations that appear in relationships in which one side’s autonomy is 
enhanced by giving a degree of responsibility to the other, including 
responsibility for the first side’s own mistakes. Suppose a father sees on a bottle 
of baby formula, “1st Choice of Doctors.”45 If he thought about it, he might 
recognize that “1st” is not a cardinal, but an ordinal number. If he thought a bit 
more, he might realize that “1st Choice of Doctors,” could mean only first choice 
of doctors who express a preference, and that if most doctors do not have a 
preference, the phrase might not mean that a majority, or even a plurality, of 
doctors recommend the product. Although the ideally reasonable consumer 
might do all this, it is not obvious that it would be a productive use of his mental 
energy. On any given day, he is likely to encounter many advertisements and 
make many small purchasing decisions. Because consumers are not gods, a rule 
that expects them to stop and think about every claim is not likely to increase 
consumer autonomy but reduce it. 
The point is not simply that advertisers are the least-cost avoiders, but 
that mass consumer markets generate new types of moral relationships 
between producers and consumers. Shiffrin argues that advertisers acquire a 
 
44 EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF 75 
(2017). 
45 The example comes from Mead Johnson v. Abbott Laboratories, supra note 
31. 
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responsibility not to cause false beliefs in consumers by choosing to participate 
in and benefit from mass consumer markets. 
 
Conceiving producers as having quasi-fiduciary responsibilities to 
consumers is a way of underscoring that, if it is to be justified, our 
property and production system must be regarded as a decentralized 
yet cooperative project for mutual gain; thus, its design should follow 
that conception. Then, the assignment of greater responsibility for 
consumers follows as a natural complement to affording producers 
greater control and access to the modes of production. The producer 
has these property rights as a decentralized agent of the public 
cooperative project and heightened communicative responsibilities 
figure among the complimentary components of that role as an agent.46 
 
Such moral responsibilities recommend imposing on advertisers strict liability 
for deceptive advertising without inquiring into the reasonableness of consumer 
reliance. The new obligations that the law imposes on advertisers reflect new 
ethical relationships generated by mass consumer markets. 
3 An Advertiser’s Duties to Competitors 
Although an advertiser’s duty not to deceive consumers differs from 
correlate tort obligations, the idea that those duties are owed to consumers is 
fairly straightforward. That a duty is owed to someone entails that that person 
is likely to be harmed by its violation.47 Because false advertising clearly harms 
consumers, it is easy to understand why advertisers might owe them a duty not 
to deceive. Less obvious is that an advertiser might owe the very same duty—
 
46 Shiffrin, supra note 34, at 489. Elsewhere Shiffrin contrasts the duty not to 
deceive with the duty not to lie: 
The wrong of lying, by contrast, is not essentially that it risks implanting 
or leaving false beliefs in the recipient’s mind. Rather, the wrong of lying 
is that it operates on a maxim that, if it were universalized and 
constituted a public rule of permissible action, would deprive us of 
reliable access to a crucial set of truths and a reliable way to sort the 
true from the false. Deception is wrong because it unduly hazards the 
false for the deceiver’s own purposes, whereas lying is wrong because it 
places the certainty of truth out of reach for the liar’s own purposes. 
SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND THE LAW 23 
(2014). 
47 To be clear, the converse is not necessarily true. The fact that B is or is likely 
to be harmed by A’s action does not entail that A has an obligation to B not to 
do it. 
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the duty not to deceive consumers—also to its competitors. This part explores 
that aspect of false advertising law.48 
A deceptive advertisement might harm competitors in any of several 
ways. The two most obvious are when an advertiser makes a false and 
disparaging claim about a competitor or its products, and when an advertiser 
seeks to pass off its own products as those of a competitor. Call the injuries that 
result from such acts “nominative harms,” as they derive from statements, 
express or implied, about the competitor or its products. Alternatively, or in 
addition, a false advertisement might harm a competitor by luring customers 
away from it. An honest business might find it difficult to compete with the 
apparent deals offered by a dishonest one. Call these “lost-volume harms.” 
Finally, false advertisements can cause generic harms to all competitors. Left 
unchecked, they reduce the credibility of commercial advertising in general, 
causing consumers to be skeptical of truthful claims businesses make and the 
quality of goods or services in a market. 
The principal torts giving competitors standing to sue for deceptive acts, 
including false advertisements, target nominative harms.49 Slander of title and 
trade libel both involve derogatory falsehoods about the plaintiff’s goods, 
services, or business.50 In trademark infringement and passing off, the 
defendant misrepresents its own products as those of the plaintiff.51 And in 
each the legal wrong corresponds to a familiar ethical wrong. Trade libel and 
slander of title are examples of calumny. Passing off is a type of free riding and, 
when the defendant’s products are of lower quality, akin to disparagement. 
As mentioned in Part Two, early judicial construction of the FTC Act and 
the Lanham Act tended to read them in light of the above torts, restricting their 
scope to nominative and closely related harms. The 1938 amendments to the 
FTC Act and the 1988 amendments to the Lanham Act expanded the scope of 
each.52 The new “unfair or deceptive acts and practices” language in the FTC Act 
added harms to consumers, establishing the FTC’s role as a consumer protection 
 
48 For a highly instructive discussion of many of the issues in this Part, albeit with 
a somewhat different focus, see Nicolas Cornell, Competition Wrongs, 129 Yale 
L.J. (forthcoming 2020). 
49 Torts designed to protect competitors that address nondeceptive behavior, 
such as intentional interference with contractual relations and wrongful 
exercise of market power, lie at a greater distance from false advertising law.  
50 See Restatement of Torts §§ 624, 626 (1938) (rules for slander of title and 
trade libel); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A cmt. a (1977) (injurious 
falsehood torts apply “chiefly in cases of the disparagement of property in land, 
chattels or intangible things or of their quality.”). 
51 Restatement of Torts §§ 717, 741 (1938) (rules for trademark infringement 
and passing off). 
52 The history of trademark law exhibits a similar trajectory from nominative 
harms to less direct harms, which there fall under the headings of consumer 
confusion. See McKenna, supra note 3. 
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agency. The amendments to the Lanham Act extended it beyond passing off to 
reach any advertiser representation about “his or her or another person’s 
goods, services, or commercial activities.”53 The false representation no longer 
needed to relate to the competitor’s product. 
This shift from nominative to lost-volume harms might be read to mean 
that the Lanham and FTC Acts have evolved from laws designed to protect 
competitors to laws designed to protect consumers. It is the nature of 
competition for sellers to lose business to one another—to experience lost 
volume—without being wronged. Ronald Dworkin calls these “bare competition 
harms.” 
 
No one could begin to lead a life if bare competition harm were 
forbidden. We live our lives mostly like swimmers in separate 
demarcated lanes. . . . [E]ach person may concentrate on swimming his 
own race without concern for the fact that if he wins, another person 
must therefore lose.54 
 
The obvious victim of a false advertisement is the deceived consumer. Any 
resulting lost-volume harms to competitors are by comparison incidental and 
diffuse—incidental because the duty not to deceive is owed the consumer 
audience; diffuse because it is impossible to know which, if any competitor, 
might have lost a sale. On this view, competitors are given standing to sue not 
to vindicate their own losses, but to serve as private attorneys general, with the 
real goal being to protect consumers. As one court has opined, “[w]hile the Act 
is not directly available to consumers, it is nevertheless designed to protect 
consumers, by giving the cause of action to competitors who are prepared to 
vindicate the injury caused to consumers.”55 
There is something to this reading. When deciding Lanham Act cases 
courts regularly emphasize the need to protect consumers from false 
advertising, and the focus in litigation is on consumer harms. Consider the rule 
for determining whether an advertisement has deceived a substantial portion of 
the audience. Courts generally agree that what counts as a substantial portion 
 
53 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 
3946 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). 
54 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 287-88 (2011). 
55 Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 212 (D.D.C. 1989), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Coca-Cola Co. v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[C]ompetitors have the 
greatest interest in stopping misleading advertising, and ... section 43(a) allows 
those parties with the greatest interest in enforcement, and in many situations 
with the greatest resources to devote to a lawsuit, to enforce the statute 
rigorously.”); Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising 
under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 807, 874-77 (1999) (arguing that the 
purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect consumers). 
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depends on the magnitude of the harm to individual consumers. A smaller 
number of deceived audience members might qualify as “substantial” if the 
falsehood is likely to cause them more severe harms.56 The rule has nothing to 
do with the nature of the harm, actual or probable, to the competitor-plaintiff. 
All that matters is harm to consumers. More generally, to establish Lanham Act 
standing a competitor “need not plead actual harm; the likelihood of harm is 
the statutory criterion.”57 Whether the competitor-plaintiff was actually harmed 
enters into litigation, if at all, only at the case’s conclusion and only should a 
successful plaintiff seek damages in addition to or instead of injunctive relief. 
There is no doubt that consumers benefit from competitor suits under 
the Lanham Act, and that this is a good thing. But the fact that the 
contemporary Lanham Act is designed to protect consumers does not entail that 
consumer protection is its sole purpose. 
As originally enacted, both the FTC Act and the Lanham Act targeted 
unfair competition, not consumer deception. During these periods, some courts 
and commentators sought to extend the statutes’ reach by identifying ways in 
which a false advertisement that did not mention a competitor’s product—that 
did not cause it a nominative harm—might nonetheless wrong the competitor.58 
An example is Justice Brandeis’s 1922 majority opinion in FTC v. Winsted Hosiery 
Co. At issue was a challenge to an FTC finding that the defendant’s false labeling 
of its underwear as woolen constituted unfair competition, despite the absence 
of trade libel or passing off—in other words, despite the absence of a 
nominative harm. 
 
[The facts show] that the practice constitutes an unfair method of 
competition as against manufacturers of all wool knit underwear and as 
 
56 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 429 (1972), aff’d 481 F.2d 246 
(6th Cir. 1973); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). As the Restatement of Unfair Competition explains, “when the 
potential injury to the deceived consumers is relatively great, a more modest 
likelihood of harm to competitors may be sufficient to subject the actor to 
liability.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 3 cmt. e (1995). 
57 Hall v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 705 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)’s provision that a false advertiser “shall be liable in a civil 
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 
such act.”). 
58 In addition to the sources discussed in the above paragraph, see, e.g., Ely-
Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev’d on other 
grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927) (suggesting a single-source exception to the 
requirement of a nominative harm); Restatement of Torts § 761 (1939) 
(suggesting that any competitor whose goods had ingredients or qualities falsely 
claimed by another had standing to sue); Milton Handler, False and Misleading 
Advertising, 39 Yale L.J. 22, 34-42 (1929) (arguing that lost-volume harms should 
suffice for competitor standing). 
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against those manufacturers of mixed wool and cotton underwear who 
brand their product truthfully. For when misbranded goods attract 
customers by means of the fraud which they perpetrate, trade is 
diverted from the producer of truthfully marked goods. That these, 
honest manufacturers might protect their trade by also resorting to 
deceptive labels is no defense to this proceeding brought against the 
Winsted Company in the public interest.59 
  
Writing in 1948, Rudolph Callmann, drawing on the civil law, argued along the 
same lines that “the action for unfair competition is not founded upon a 
violation of property rights but upon the failure to respect an affirmative code 
of ethics that stems from the competitive relationship.”60 The 1938 and 1988 
amendments to the FTC and Lanham Acts, which expressly authorized the FTC 
and competitors to go after false advertisers, rendered such arguments 
unnecessary. But their logic still holds. A false advertiser wrongs its competitors 
by not adhering to the ethics of the marketplace. The wrong is the wrong of 
gaining an unfair advantage through cheating.61 
Which acts qualify as cheating depends on the rules of the marketplace. 
Steven Gelber has argued, for example, that in the nineteenth century United 
States it was generally expected that a horse trader would try to put one over 
on the buyer.62 In such a market the buyer who has been taken in might 
 
59 FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922). The Court adopted 
similar reasoning twelve years later, in a case involving candy packaging 
designed to manipulate children by offering them a chance at prizes: 
A method of competition which casts upon one’s competitors the 
burden of the loss of business unless they will descend to a practice 
which they are under a powerful moral compulsion not to adopt, even 
though it is not criminal, was thought to involve the kind of unfairness 
at which the [FTC Act] was aimed. 
FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934). 
60 Rudolph Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 
876, 877 (1948). 
61 Cornell, supra note 48, identifies another example of competitor standing for 
violations of rules designed to protect neither competitors nor competition: 
competitor suits for violations of employment laws. See, e.g., Commercial 
Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 271 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2001) (competitor 
standing under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1961 et seq., for alleged hiring of undocumented aliens); Diva Limousine, Ltd. v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-CV-05546-EMC, 2019 WL 2548459 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 
2019) (competitor standing under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. 
& Prof. Code § 17200, for alleged misclassification of ride-share drivers as 
independent contractors). 
62 STEVEN M. GELBER, HORSE TRADING IN THE AGE OF CARS: MEN IN THE MARKETPLACE 8-
10 (2008). Although one suspects that Gelber is sometimes given to hyperbole, 
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consider himself wronged. Common wisdom held that professional horse 
traders were scoundrels. But the seller who lost a sale to a competitor’s 
deceptive practices would have no cause for complaint. “The morality—or more 
precisely, immorality—of horse trading derived from the way it operated as a 
game. . . . Horse traders expected to be judged by the ethics of the game.”63 In 
such a market, although a seller’s deceptive acts might wrong the buyer, they 
would not wrong other sellers. The commonly understood rules of the market 
permitted such behavior. 
Gelber’s account of horse trading illustrates what Balleisen describes as 
“the historically contingent nature of what constituted fraud and who qualified 
as an authoritative interpreter of commercial culture, especially in domains of 
economic life characterized by a great deal of entrepreneurial innovation.”64 The 
past century and a half have seen a seismic shift away from caveat emptor, both 
in the law and in the broader culture. With respect to advertising, the origin of 
the change lay not in a new understanding of what businesses owed one 
another. The duty to play by the rules of the game does not specify what those 
rules are. It came, rather, from new understandings of businesses’ obligations to 
consumers—as exemplified by the changes to the FTC and Lanham acts and 
enactment of state UDAP statutes. Today the commonly recognized norms of 
the consumer marketplace prohibit deceptive advertising. Violating those rules 
harms consumers—as deceptive advertising always has. But with the 
emergence of the rules of the consumer market, we can now say it also wrongs 
honest competitors. This is the ethical component of competitor suits under the 
Lanham Act. 
4 Transfer Remedies, Private Enforcement, and Courts 
Part Two identified four structural features commonly associated with 
the private law, each of which appears in U.S. false advertising law: horizontal 
duties, transfer remedies, private enforcement, and the role of courts. I have so 
far focused on the horizontal duties advertisers owe consumers and 
competitors. Although not equivalent to ancestral torts, those duties are 
comprehensible in terms familiar to the private law. Advertisers are responsible 
for not deceiving consumers, even when the deception is in a sense the 
consumer’s own fault. And they have an obligation to competitors to play by 
commonly understood rules of the market, or a duty not to cheat. I now 
consider the other structural features false advertising law shares with the 
private law. 
 
his description of the horse market is highly engaging. “Nobody—not your 
neighbor, your best friend, your church brethren, not even the minister 
himself—could be trusted in a horse trade.” Id. at 9. 
63 Id. at 15. 
64 Supra note 44, at 99-100. For more on the shift, see id. at 50-54, 97-99. 
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Competitor suits under the Lanham Act look very much like other 
private lawsuits and might advance the same values. Although lost-volume 
losses can be difficult to prove, competitors regularly receive injunctive relief 
and sometimes monetary damages. Competitor-victims of false advertising have 
the resources to go to court to vindicate their rights, and they regularly do. With 
respect to competitors, then, private enforcement and transfer remedies might 
serve the same purposes or advance the same values in false advertising law 
they do elsewhere in the private law.65 
The nature of mass advertising, however, creates significant hurdles to 
both consumer-oriented transfer remedies and consumer enforcement.  
Some challenges to providing consumer transfer remedies are of a piece 
with providing compensation to consumers generally. It is expensive to deliver 
small monetary awards to a large, diffuse, often heterogeneous group of 
victims.66 Others are specific to false advertising. Because advertisements are 
broadcast to a large, passive audience, it can be especially difficult to determine 
who received the message and was harmed as a result. Nor is it always obvious 
how to quantify harms to consumer victims. Papa John’s false advertisements 
about the quality of its pizza ingredients might cause Domino’s to lose 
business,67 but how should we value the harm to the consumer who chose to 
eat one company’s pizza rather than the other’s? Finally, whereas injunctive 
relief might provide a direct benefit to a competitor that has suffered a lost-
volume harm and protect consumers going forward, it is not obvious how such 
relief benefits the consumer victim of an earlier false advertisement. Although it 
is reasonable to think that the producer of a deceptive advertisement owes 
 
65 A more substantive theory of the purposes and principles of private 
enforcement and transfer remedies would have more to say on this matter. 
Benjamin Zipursky, for example, argues in this volume that private enforcement 
addresses the worry that public enforcement will “render individual protection 
extraordinarily vulnerable to the influence of the rich, powerful, and well 
connected, as against the poor, powerless, and unconnected.” Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Civil Recourse Theory, in Oxford Handbook of New Private Law ___, 
___ (A. Gold et al. eds., 2020). It is not obvious that the same worry applies to 
the typical Lanham Act plaintiff, which is a large, well-resourced corporation. 
66 Although the above sentence might seem obvious, there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence for it. Based on a 2015 review of the literature, Brian 
Fitzpatrick and Robert Gilbert conclude that the “existing data on consumer 
class actions is far from sufficient to make any conclusions about whether they 
can serve a compensatory function.” Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert, An 
Empirical Look at Compensation in Consumer Class Actions, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 
767, 778 (2015). 
67 See Pizza Hut Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, 80 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Tex. 2000) 
(granting successful Lanham Act plaintiff injunctive relief and costs of running 
corrective advertisements), rev’d on other grounds, 227 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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something to consumers deceived by it, it is not always obvious what that is or 
how to get it to them. 
Consumer enforcement also faces challenges. Because compensatory 
measures are low, consumer suits often take the form of class actions. Here the 
structure of U.S. false advertising law poses doctrinal hurdles. Although 
advertisements often reach a national audience, consumers have standing to 
sue only under state laws that vary across jurisdictions, making it difficult or 
impossible to bring nationwide class actions. More generally, one might wonder 
whether aggregating claims serves values commonly associated with private 
enforcement. By distributing enforcement powers to the private sphere, class 
actions might serve a democratizing or equalizing function. But because the 
decision makers in a class action are the attorneys who organize and litigate the 
suit, it is not obvious that class actions significantly advance the autonomy 
interests of class members in the ways individual enforcement actions can.68 
A third challenge to a private law approach to false advertising cases 
applies to both competitor and consumer suits. Courts of general jurisdiction do 
not have the institutional competence to answer all the factual questions a false 
advertising case typically poses. Judges and juries are well equipped to address 
the factual questions that appear in a typical deceit or negligent 
misrepresentation case: What did the defendant say? Was it true or false? Was 
the defendant at fault for the falsehood? Was the plaintiff at fault for relying? 
They have less competence with respect to the central factual question in false 
advertising litigation: Did the defendant’s advertisement cause or was it likely to 
cause a false belief in a substantial portion of its audience? Answering that 
question commonly requires the use of empirical studies such as copy tests and 
surveys, together with the expertise of social psychologists and others. Judges 
and juries are unlikely to have the background needed to evaluate evidence of 
this type.69 The FTC and some state attorneys general, in distinction, are repeat 
players with their own economists, psychologists, and other experts. And when 
 
68 For the tensions between the management of class actions and the values of 
private enforcement, see Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent 
vs. Closure, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 265, 311-20 (2011). 
69 See Burns, supra note 55 at 864-67 (listing reasons why courts are ill-equipped 
to determine whether an advertisement is false or misleading); Richard J. 
Leighton, Literal Falsity by Necessary Implication: Presuming Deception without 
Evidence in Lanham Act Cases, 97 Trademark Rep. 1286 (2007) (“Many federal 
judges appear to have reservations about the need for, and reliability of, 
perception surveys and other extrinsic evidence offered to show how a 
challenged claim is interpreted by its intended audience.”); Rebecca Tushnet, It 
Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in 
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 227, 253 (2007) (expresses the 
“suspicion . . . that juries may not be better at [deciding whose meaning to 
endorse], and may systematically be worse than agencies with experience 
evaluating a variety of advertising claims over time.”). 
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a public enforcement body designs an empirical study or hires an expert, it does 
not have a financial stake in the results. False advertising law’s shift away from 
an inquiry into truth and fault and toward questions of cause and effect has not 
robbed it of its ethical content. But that shift has perhaps rendered traditional 
forms of adjudication less suited to its enforcement. 
The remedies and adjudicative mechanisms one finds in contract, tort, 
property and other more traditional areas of private law were not handed down 
from on high. They were designed to address practical problems generated by 
specific types of interactions in particular social contexts. Horizontal duties built 
on the basis of commonly understood moral obligations, backward-looking 
transfer remedies, and private enforcement in courts of general jurisdiction 
function well when applied to breaches of exchange agreements, accidents, 
trespass, and the like. Those mechanisms are not equally suited to the one-
many relationships generated by mass consumer markets, including the 
relationship between advertiser and its audience. 
Conclusion 
In the past century and a half, mass consumer markets have created the 
conditions for new forms of interpersonal wrongs. These include not only 
deceptive advertising, but also defective products and unfair adhesive contract 
terms. In the United States, the legal response has largely been piecemeal, 
transmutative, and generative. Early legislation addressing false advertising 
drew on design elements from the common law, and false advertising law 
continues to exhibit those genetic markers. But they do not express themselves 
in the same form. As false advertising law has evolved, it has imposed on 
advertisers new types of obligations, and it has turned to new mechanisms of 
enforcement and remedial rules better suited to the one-many structure of 
consumer transactions. 
Notwithstanding the law’s adoption of a consequentialist and welfarist 
framework, however, advertisers’ obligations to consumers and to competitors 
can be understood in ethical terms familiar to the private law. Rather than a 
duty not to lie or utter falsehoods, advertisers have a responsibility to 
consumers not to cause them false beliefs. Rather than a duty not to disparage 
another business or its products, advertisers have a duty to competitors to play 
by the rules of the marketplace. In this respect, U.S. false advertising law shows 
its private law roots, even if its branches extend well beyond them. 
